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ABSTRACT This article places recent evidence of Hayek’s public defense of the Pinochet regime in 
the context of the work of the other great 20th century classical liberals, Milton Friedman and James 
M. Buchanan. Hayek’s view that liberty was only instrumentally valuable is contrasted with 
Buchanan’s account of liberty situated in the notion of the inviolable individual. It is argued that 
Hayek’s theory left him with no basis on which to demarcate the legitimate actions of the state, so that 
conceivably any government action could be justified on consequentialist grounds. Furthermore, 
Friedman’s account of freedom and discretionary power undermines Hayek’s proposal that a 
transitional dictatorship could pave the way for a genuinely free society.  
 
1. Introduction 
There have long been rumors and counter-rumors about F. A. Hayek’s alleged support for the 
Pinochet regime. Farrant & McPhail’s article in this issue shows that at best Hayek was in a 
state of denial about the regime and at worse was prepared to justify horrific human rights 
abuses in the cause of anti-Communism and economic liberalization. No one can read the 
Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (1993), which 
details the thousands of arbitrary arrests, summary executions, and imprisonments without 
due process that took place under the Pinochet regime, and be impressed with Hayek’s claim 
that ‘I have not been able to find a single person even in much maligned Chile who did not 
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agree that personal freedom was greater under Pinochet than it had been under Allende’ 
(Farrant & McPhail, 2015).  
As Farrant & McPhail show, Hayek was at best ambivalent in his criticism of a 
number of authoritarian regimes, including the Salazar regime in Portugal, the military 
dictatorship in Argentina and Pinochet’s government in Chile. Farrant & McPhail argue that 
Hayek subscribed to a notion of transitional dictatorship—the view that an authoritarian 
regime could facilitate a transition to a liberal order more effectively than a democratic 
government. It appears to have been on this basis that Hayek was willing to turn a blind eye 
to human rights abuses if those abuses were committed in order to facilitate a long-term 
transition to a more liberal order.  
This paper will consider Hayek’s actions as a public intellectual with those of the 
other two of the ‘big three’ of 20th century classical liberal economists: Milton Friedman and 
James M. Buchanan.  First, we briefly discuss how each viewed political engagement and 
talk about Hayek’s ideas about liberty and transitional dictatorships, with special attention to 
Buchanan’s contrary view of liberty and how it serves to ground a critique of Hayek. We then 
examine Friedman’s own association with Pinochet and how his views on freedom and 
discretion relate to Hayek’s understanding of transitional dictatorship. We conclude by 
reflecting on Hayek’s support for transitional dictatorships and for Pinochet in particular. 
 
2. Hayek’s Ideas and the Relevance of the Pinochet Revelations 
Hayek and Friedman are two notable examples of economists who used their scholarly status 
as a springboard into public life. Both were active writing books and lecturing for general 
audiences, appearing in newspapers and on the radio and television, and advising political 
actors at home and abroad. Given that they shared classical liberal views at odds with the 
reigning orthodoxy of their time, it is unsurprising that their engagement with the political 
world was controversial. It can be argued that much of the influence that Friedman and 
Hayek exerted upon the world of policy and politics can be attributed to their engagement 
with public discourse and their efforts in institution building for the cause of classical 
liberalism.  
Not all distinguished scholars choose to avail themselves of such opportunities.  
James M. Buchanan largely eschewed the public sphere as a matter of principle even at the 
cost of political influence (Buchanan, 2007, p. 97).  There are nevertheless dangers for any 
scholar who chooses to align himself with political figures, partisan or bureaucratic. Most 
significant is the danger of ‘guilt by association’. By definition, practical politicians introduce 
policies across a range of domains, and although a scholar may agree with the main thrust of 
policy, there will always be specific issues where disagreement exists, though such nuances 
may be lost in the popular imagination. 
It can be argued that the dalliances of scholars with particular politicians are the 
unfortunate but ephemeral business of day-to-day politics that will, or should, be ultimately 
forgotten, while a scholar’s contribution to the realm of ideas will endure. Farrant & McPhail 
(2015) argue, however, that Hayek’s support for Pinochet is a direct result of Hayek’s belief 
in the capacity of transitional dictatorship to facilitate a shift to a more liberal order and that 
his position vis-à-vis Pinochet therefore constitutes an indictment of key aspects of Hayek’s 
intellectual contribution. 
We agree that Hayek’s defense of Pinochet has important implications for our 
understanding and assessment of his whole intellectual contribution, but we argue that the 
implications for Hayek’s social and political theory may be more serious than Farrant & 
McPhail claim as they go to the core of his views about liberty—a crucial aspect of the 
thought of any liberal scholar.   
Hayek’s enterprise can be understood as an attempt to synthesis the Kantian and 
Humean traditions of liberal thought; traditions that emphasize, respectively, the importance 
of individual reason and rational construction and of evolutionary processes without 
conscious control in the development of modern liberal societies. Hayek’s unique intellectual 
contribution stems from the bold, although surely unsuccessful, attempt to bring together the 
Kantian and Humean (Kukathas, 1989). 
The tensions between Kantian deontological positions and Humean consequentialist 
arguments are particularly apparent in Hayek’s case for liberty. Hayek (1960, p. 12) sets out a 
purely negative conception of liberty, arguing, in Kantian terms, that freedom describes the 
absence of coercion, so that ‘the only infringement of it is coercion by men’ and ‘the range of 
physical possibilities from which a person can choose at a given moment has no direct 
relevance to freedom.’  
While Hayek defines liberty in Kantian terms, his account of the value of liberty is 
Humean. Hayek argues that freedom does not have intrinsic value but is instrumentally 
valuable because it is necessary to secure the collective benefits of social and economic 
progress: ‘What is important is not what freedom I personally would like to exercise but what 
freedom some person may need in order to do things beneficial to society’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 
32). For Hayek (1960, p. 29), ‘the case for individual freedom’ does not rest upon a 
deontological account of the dignity of the individual, but rather follows from an appreciation 
of the incompatibility of socialist central planning and a complex, advanced society. People 
must be free to use their own personal knowledge in order that an advanced market order can 
exist; so the case for liberty ‘rests chiefly on the recognition of the inevitable ignorance of all 
of us concerning a great many of the factors on which the achievement of our ends and 
welfare depends’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 29).   
It is significant that for Hayek should our fundamental ignorance of how to plan a 
complex, advanced economy miraculously disappear, the case for liberty would also 
evaporate: ‘If there were omniscient men, if we could know not only all that affects the 
attainment of our present wishes but also our future wants and desires, there would be little 
case for liberty’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 29). Given the nature of the allegations surrounding 
Hayek’s support for Pinochet this statement is particularly unfortunate.  
It should be unsurprising that for Hayek democracy similarly has only instrumental 
value. Hayek (1960, p. 106) wrote: ‘However strong the general case for democracy, it is not 
an ultimate or absolute value and must be judged by what it will achieve. It is probably the 
best method for achieving certain ends, but not an end in itself’. For Hayek, democracy was 
important as a peaceful means of removing an unpopular or ineffective government, but no 
special value should be attributed to a decision because it happened to reflect the will of a 
numerical majority of the voting population.  
Concerns about the threat of majoritarian tyranny implicit in democratic decision-
making occupy a place within mainstream liberal thought. But when those concerns are 
coupled with Hayek’s rejection of the idea that liberty has any intrinsic value, we seem to be 
left in the altogether uncomfortable position that individual freedom is only to be enforced 
and individuals are only to be allowed to participate in collective decision-making if it can be 
demonstrated that socially beneficial outcomes follow. But Hayek does not specify who will 
make such judgments or what criteria will be used to evaluate social benefit – other than to 
imply that he is able to make such judgments against criteria he has devised.  
As Farrant & McPhail (2015) note, Hayek viewed the Allende government as an 
example of the excesses of majoritarian democracy. Allende had been elected via a broad, 
popular mandate that he then used—illegitimately, in the view of some observers—to 
introduce radical socialist policies, including the nationalization of the financial and 
productive sectors of the economy, the expropriation of large swathes of rural property and 
the introduction of extensive price controls (Valdés, 1995, pp. 6–7).Given Hayek’s views 
about the purely instrumental value of democracy and the most efficacious economic policy, 
it hardly surprising that he supported Pinochet’s actions in overthrowing the Allende regime 
and setting Chile on a new economic course.  
However, while the Pinochet regime did introduce economic reforms that correlated 
with an impressive period of economic growth, the regime also embarked upon ‘a system of 
institutionalized terror’ designed to destroy opposition in the traditional parties of the left, 
trade unions and elsewhere. As a consequence, more than 2,000 people ‘disappeared’, many 
more people were summarily arrested and tortured, and hundreds of thousands of Chileans 
were exiled, so that all formal opposition to the regime was driven underground (Chilean 
National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, 1993; Valdés, 1995, p. 30). The evidence 
presented by Farrant & McPhail makes clear that Hayek knew of these abuses but was 
nevertheless willing to give public support to the Pinochet regime. Hayek’s statements on this 
matter expose a fundamental weakness of his thought that follows from his failure to ascribe 
intrinsic value to liberty and to utilize a conception of universal and inalienable individual 
rights.  
Hayek’s belief that liberty is only instrumentally valuable is consistent with the fact 
that he generally eschewed the language of rights (Kukathas, 1989, p. 144). He did, however, 
on occasion invoke the concept of rights in describing the role of government in the 
protection of individual liberty. In The Mirage of Social Justice, for example, Hayek (1976, 
p. 101) wrote that ‘where men have formed organizations such as government for enforcing 
rules of conduct, the individual will have a claim in justice on government that his right be 
protected and infringements made good’. But Hayek stressed that such rights were not 
universal or absolute, but were simply obligations that arose on occasions between particular 
persons or organizations. While Hayek’s principal concern in this context was to critique the 
notion of social rights, it is nevertheless apparent that for Hayek there were no natural, 
inalienable or universal rights. Although Hayek saw rights as a useful term to describe the 
individual liberty he considered instrumentally important for the maintenance of a prosperous 
society, he did not see rights as describing a particular category of universal or absolute 
protections ascribed to all individuals as individuals. 
James M. Buchanan likewise did not subscribe to an account of natural rights. 
Buchanan similarly saw rights as emerging from political agreement, but for Buchanan this 
was because individuals were the ultimate source of value, so rights could not exist 
independently of the values of individual men and women. Rights were created when people 
chose to respect the persons and property of others. For Buchanan, rights were agreed as part 
of the process by which people left the state of nature and entered into the social contract. 
Rights come into existence when some general agreement to respect the rights of others is 
formalized into law (Buchanan, 1974). 
Buchanan took a methodological and ethical individualist approach based upon the 
Kantian precept that individuals must be treated as ends and never as means. No individual 
has any more or less moral worth than any other person and therefore no individual may be 
sacrificed for the benefit of others. For Buchanan (1977, p. 244), ‘individual human beings 
are the ultimate ethical units.… [P]ersons are to be treated strictly as ends and never as 
means, and that there are no transcendental, suprapersonal norms’. Accordingly, ‘Individual 
freedom’ is important, ‘not as an instrumental element in attaining economic or cultural bliss, 
and not as some metaphysically superior value,’ but because it must follow from the adoption 
of methodological and ethical individualism (Buchanan, 1974, pp. 5–6). For Buchanan, 
individuals are the ultimate source of value and nothing could be done to individuals without 
their consent, unless, of course, they had transgressed the rights of others, in which case 
punishment that had also been unanimously pre-agreed should follow. For Buchanan, each 
individual was a veto-player vis-à-vis the legitimate actions of the state (Buchanan, 1974; 
Meadowcroft, 2011).  
Hayek’s social and political theory did not rule out the abuses of the Pinochet regime, 
given that he viewed individual liberty as only instrumentally valuable, and he would have 
considered the overarching economic goals of the regime socially beneficial. Buchanan’s 
constitutional political economy, by contrast, did preclude the actions of the Pinochet 
government (and indeed those of the Allende government in going beyond its electoral 
mandate) given that we can assume that the victims of the regime would not have consented 
to their abuse. Thus Hayek’s support for Pinochet is indicative of a fundamental weakness of 
his scholarly position that is not present in Buchanan’s work. 
 
3. Friedman and Pinochet: Freedom and Discretion 
Given Buchanan’s principled aloofness from politics, he was untouched by controversy over 
Pinochet. Friedman, though, was not able to avoid such controversy due to his well-known 
connection, direct and indirect, with Pinochet’s Chile. This controversy followed him 
throughout his career (and beyond; see Klein, 2007).Yet Friedman’s stated views about Chile 
and his more general ideas about liberty provide a critique of Hayek’s more accepting stance 
towards dictatorships. 
In terms of indirect connections, Friedman’s free-market approach—and especially 
his scholarly work on monetary policy—was a major intellectual influence on Pinochet’s 
economic team (the ‘Chicago Boys’) and its infamous economic reform plan for Chile 
(outlined in a 1970 document known as ‘el ladrillo’ or ‘the brick’). For some of these 
policymakers, the connection with Friedman occurred in the classroom. Under the auspices of 
a pre-Pinochet USAID-financed relationship between the University of Chicago and the 
Catholic University of Chile, a stream of Chilean students studied economics at Chicago from 
1955 to 1964. Some of these were later involved with the Pinochet regime—though 
importantly they were not key figures until after the failure of the regime’s initial attempts to 
manage the economy.  As Deirdre McCloskey (2003) has pointed out, Friedman’s colleagues 
Al Harberger, Larry Sjaastad, and Greg Lewis—not Friedman himself—were the key 
‘connections’ to Chile and these students.  
But Friedman had a more direct connection with Chile than his academic work.  He 
visited Chile on two occasions during Pinochet’s rule. The most important visit was a six day 
trip in March 1975 arranged by Harberger. During those six days, Friedman participated in 
seminars (planned for ‘government officials, representatives of the public, and members of 
the military’) and gave public lectures (Friedman & Friedman, 1998, p. 399). Most 
importantly, Friedman was a member of a small group that met with Pinochet for 
approximately 45 minutes.  During that short meeting, Friedman and the others discussed 
using ‘shock treatment’ to deal with Chile’s economic woes (ibid.). At Pinochet’s request, 
Friedman produced a brief report of the Chilean situation that he sent as a letter to the 
General on April 21, 1975.  Ruger (2011, p. ???) summarizes it as follows: 
 
Friedman unsurprisingly told the president to adopt a package of free-market and 
monetarist reforms. In particular, Friedman argued that Chile’s inflation problems 
were so severe that ‘shock treatment’ was necessary, despite his typical preference for 
gradualism. Such treatment would include drastically cutting the rate of increase in 
the money supply, cutting the fiscal deficit by substantially reducing government 
spending, and publicly committing to abjure printing money to finance future 
government spending. He also advocated that the government promote a ‘social 
market economy’ by removing barriers (such as wage and price controls) to the 
effective working of market forces and freeing international trade. In short, Friedman 
counseled that ‘No obstacles, no subsidies should be the rule.’ Showing he was not 
unsympathetic to the hardships this would cause, nor unappreciative of the politics of 
reform, Friedman also argued that the government should ‘provide for the relief of 
any cases of real hardship and severe distress among the poorest classes.’ 
 
Friedman later claimed that he ‘never advised Pinochet’ (for example, see Friedman, 1991b).  
However, both the meeting and the report sound like advice—though it is certainly true that 
he was never an advisor with any official post or in unofficial regular contact with the 
regime. Friedman himself admitted that the meeting with Pinochet ‘gave an iota of substance 
to later charges that I was a personal adviser to the general’ (Friedman & Friedman, 1998, p. 
399).  However, it is worth noting that Pinochet himself told Friedman that the report’s 
substance coincided with the plan that had already been adopted and was then being 
implemented (Pinochet, 1975b, p. 594).  Hence, Friedman’s advice had little independent 
influence.  
There is also evidence from before controversy erupted over his visit that Friedman 
was no fan of Pinochet’s dictatorship. As Harberger (1976, p. ???) notes,  Friedman  declined 
‘two offers of honorary degrees from Chilean universities, precisely because he felt that 
acceptance of such honors from universities receiving government funds could be interpreted 
as implying political approval.’  Friedman also gave an ‘anti-totalitarian’ lecture in Chile 
titled ‘The Fragility of Freedom’ in which he argued that centralization destroys freedom, 
free markets are essential to maintaining freedom, and political freedom allowed markets to 
function best (see Friedman, 2000). Later, in the midst of the controversy, Friedman noted 
that if he had been a Chilean, he would, ‘if possible have opposed both [Allende and 
Pinochet]— or alternatively  have emigrated’—and that he ‘would fervently wish their 
replacement by free democratic societies’ (Friedman, 1975b, pp. 595–596). Indeed, he called 
both options for Chile ‘two evils.’ Years later, Friedman was quite blunt about Pinochet’s 
non-economic record. In 1991, Friedman sharply noted ‘I have nothing good to say about the 
political regime that Pinochet imposed. It was a terrible political regime’ (Friedman, 1991a). 
That same year, he exclaimed in another speech:  ‘I never supported Pinochet’ (Friedman, 
1991b).  
These statements, particularly the claim that he would have opposed the regime or 
emigrated, indicate that Friedman was no advocate of Hayek’s second-best solution of a 
transitional dictatorship. Despite categorizing the Pinochet regime as evil, Friedman 
nevertheless did say that with a military junta, ‘there is more chance of a return to a 
democratic society’ (Friedman, 1975b, p. 595).  And later he trumpeted that this is exactly 
what did happen, along with an ‘economic miracle.’ Yet we have seen no evidence that 
Friedman thought the ends justified the means, despite later speaking highly of Chile’s 
ultimate economic success and proudly accepting a share of the credit for the economic job 
the Chicago Boys performed (Friedman, 1982, 1991b; Friedman & Friedman, 1998, pp. 405–
408). 
In terms of his rationale for engaging morally dubious regimes on the so-called left 
(China, Yugoslavia) or right (Chile, Iran), Friedman relied upon a consequentialist decision 
rule. He thought it was acceptable to visit, lecture, and give advice on economic policy  to 
‘political regimes you disapprove’ when doing so would ‘break down barriers between 
countries’ (Friedman 1977, p. 600). Moreover, he saw himself akin to a physician giving 
technical advice to a government so it could better ameliorate bad outcomes for society 
(Friedman, 1976, p. 596).  Most specifically, he thought it was acceptable ‘if the conditions 
seem to me to be such that economic improvement would contribute both to the well-being of 
the ordinary people and to the chance of movement towards a politically free society’ 
(Friedman, 1975b, p. 596). Of course, this position begs a lot of questions (such as whether 
advice that improves economic conditions might slow the transition to a free society) and has 
a lot of embedded assumptions (for example that the modernization thesis is correct).  But it 
is not wholly unreasonable, even if it might not be our preferred response.     
Aside from his stated positions on Pinochet’s regime, three critical aspects of 
Friedman’s political and economic thought support the conclusion that Friedman would be 
wary of Hayek’s transitional dictatorships. The first is Friedman’s argument for rules over 
discretion in monetary policy. He thought that a monetary authority with discretionary power 
was ‘a potent tool for controlling and shaping the economy’—and even destroying both the 
economy and society (Friedman, 1962a, p. 39; Friedman, 1962b, p. 429). Instead, Friedman 
supported ‘a system that will provide a monetary framework for a free enterprise economy 
yet be incapable of being used as a source of power to threaten economic and political 
freedom’ (Friedman, 1962a, p. 51). Second, Friedman worried that a centralized state with 
concentrated power was dangerous to the proper ends of government. For example, he 
claimed that preserving individual freedom ‘requires that power be dispersed, that it be 
prevented from accumulating in any one person or group of people’ (Friedman, 1962b, p. 
429).  Hence he favored limited government where rules held sway rather than men and their 
discretionary power. Friedman’s views on how central monetary authorities should approach 
monetary policy amount to a particular application of his larger position in favor of discretion 
over rules, a position that applies equally to dictators.  The empowered dictator will have at 
least the same difficulties as the discretionary central banker with the power to save or 
destroy: their historical records are not great. The information problem suggests it is 
impossible over the long run even for those with benevolent intentions to get things ‘right’, 
and political pressure and individual interest can lead to purposeful bad behavior (Friedman 
& Schwartz, 1963; Friedman, 1960; Friedman, 1961; Friedman, 1962a; Friedman, 1962b; 
Friedman & Heller, 1969, pp. 49–50; Friedman, 1992, p. 253). Of course, Hayek typically 
agreed; hence he favored limited government and markets as the first-best.  However, 
Friedman thought that there were problems with Hayek’s second-best argument too.  
Friedman did not think that authoritarianism was the only possible answer to the 
problem of creating a free society.  He thought it was a myth—fueled by Chile’s success—
that ‘only an authoritarian regime can successfully implement a free-market policy.’  Indeed, 
he thought that military juntas are especially unlikely to do so given that they are 
‘hierarchical’ and ‘organized from the top down’ whereas ‘a free market is the reverse. It is 
voluntaristic, authority is dispersed; bargaining not submission to orders is the watchword; it 
is organized from the bottom up’ (Friedman, 1982).  This is why Friedman called Chile the 
‘exception, not the rule’ (ibid.) and on more than one occasion called that country’s economic 
and more importantly political transformation a ‘miracle’ (ibid.; see also Friedman, 1991a, 
1991b).  Indeed, Friedman thought in the early 1980s that even the miracle of Chile ‘will not 
last unless the military government is replaced by a civilian government dedicated to political 
liberty . . . . Otherwise, sooner or later—and probably sooner rather than later—economic 
freedom will succumb to the authoritarian character of the military’ (Friedman, 1982).   
Friedman did think that the spread of economic liberty helped promote political 
liberty.  Yet he saw economic freedom as being merely necessary rather than necessary and 
sufficient (Friedman, 1982; see also Friedman 1962a, 1962b). And perhaps surprisingly, 
Friedman also thought that ‘political freedom in turn is a necessary condition for the long-
term maintenance of economic freedom’ (Friedman, 1982).  Therefore, again, Friedman’s 
views fail to suggest dictatorship was the answer—at least in the long term. Like Hayek, 
there are deontological and consequentialist dimensions to Friedman’s case for liberty, but 
Friedman did seem ultimately to subscribe to the view that liberty is intrinsically important, 
even if it is very difficult to untangle the intrinsic value of freedom from the outcomes it 
produced (Friedman, 1978).  
It is unlikely that Friedman would have seen transitional dictatorships as part of a 
necessary short-term solution either, since he did not see a slippery road to serfdom. 
Friedman (1982) argued that ‘although politically free societies have moved in the direction 
of collectivism, none has gone all the way except through the force of arms.’ Thus one can 
infer that he would have rejected Hayek’s schema, as depicted in Figures 1 and 2 of Farrant 
& McPhail (2015), according to which transitional dictatorship could be necessary to stem 
the slide to totalitarian democracy. Friedman did worry that political freedom might lead to 
an erosion of economic freedom via an overgrown government sector (see Friedman, 1975a), 
and in an interview with the Liberty Fund Interview (Friedman, 2003) he expressed approval 
for Hong Kong’s non-democratic but economically liberal system. These remarks do not, 
however, amount to an endorsement of Hayek’s belief in transitional dictatorship as an 
effective route to freedom.  
 
4. Conclusion 
As classical liberals, Hayek, Buchanan and Friedman all saw that democratic politics offered 
possibilities for both liberation and exploitation. Politics was the process by which socialism 
and communism could be challenged, ultimately defeated and replaced with a liberal order; 
but it could also be the process by which majorities and minorities engaged in legalized 
plunder of the property of others.   
Hayek’s view that liberty was only instrumentally valuable, and his resultant rejection 
of a rights-based approach, left him with no basis on which to demarcate the legitimate 
actions of the state. From this it appears to follow that any action of the government could be 
justified on instrumental grounds—and this, indeed, seems to have been Hayek’s position vis-
à-vis Pinochet. While Hayek had a relatively sophisticated theory of transitional dictatorship 
to justify this position, Friedman’s analysis of the implications of discretionary power for 
freedom and for effective public policy provides a good basis for rejecting this Hayekian 
position.  
Hayek’s case should serve as a warning to scholars who pursue careers as public 
intellectuals that the compromises they make in the public arena may live as long as their 
more considered contributions to the world of ideas. It should also serve as a warning of the 
dangers that arise when individual liberty is seen as one value among many, rather than a 
universal and inviolable principle.  
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